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The phenomenon of quantum erasure has long intrigued physicists, but has surprisingly found lim-
ited practical application. Here, we propose an erasure-based protocol for quantum key distribution
(QKD) that promises inherent security against detector attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ideas at the root of quantum erasure were already at
play in the famous Bohr-Einstein dialogues in the 1920’s.
In one such debate, Einstein envisaged a scenario where
one could seemingly observe interference fringes in a
double-slit experiment, as well as learn which-path infor-
mation for individual photons [1]. Bohr countered, argu-
ing that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle would prevent
one from doing exactly that. But as it later turned out,
the deeper explanation was in fact not uncertainty but
rather entanglement—a concept Einstein himself helped
put on the map in the EPR paper [2].
In 1982 Scully and Druhl [3] proposed a variant of the
double-slit experiment that sent shock-waves through the
physics community. The idea was that which-path infor-
mation can be inferred without disturbing the trajectory
of individual particles, circumventing the uncertainty ar-
gument. A simpler, subsequent proposal used excited
atoms [4]. Scully and colleagues showed that interference
would still be lost due to entanglement providing a which-
path “tag”. In the latter proposal, the presence of an
emitted photon in one of two microwave cavities placed
directly behind the two slits (with the cavities stretching
long enough for the atoms to drop from their exited state)
would indicate which slit an atom went through. How-
ever, erasing this which-path information, by removing a
wall between the two cavities, would restore the interfer-
ence fringes: quantum erasure.
While the original quantum erasure proposals have not
been implemented, other more practical ones have. For
instance, Walborn et al. [5] directed photons, each from a
polarisation-entangled pair, towards a double-slit. Each
slit had a polarisation rotator that imprinted a which-
path tag. Measuring the polarisation of the other photon
of the entangled pair in the right way erases which-path
information. Here, interference fringes can even be recov-
ered long after the photons passing through the double-
slit have been detected.
Despite its fundamental significance, quantum erasure
has for one reason or another struggled for practical ap-
plication. One notable exception is Zhao et al. recently
employing a frequency eraser to entangle, for the first
time, different-color photons [6].
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) on the other hand
enables two remote parties to share a random string of
zeros and ones. Given such a sting, provably secure com-
munication can be established [7]. Much of quantum
cryptography thus reduces to QKD. In 1984, Bennett and
Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol, the BB84 [9],
which has since been shown to be unconditionally secure
against an eavesdropper with unlimited resources [10].
However, imperfect devices, especially imperfect detec-
tors, allow powerful so called side-channel attacks that
can compromise the security of QKD. Lydersen et al. [8],
for instance, showed how the secret key in two commer-
cially available QKD systems can be fully obtained using
their detector-blinding attack, exploiting a common de-
tector imperfection.
II. METHODS
We now describe our erasure-based protocol for QKD
that promises security against detector attacks. The goal
here for “Alice” and “Bob”, the customary communicat-
ing parties in such tasks, is to securely share a random
string of zeros and ones. We start by explaining a simpli-
fied two-state version of the protocol before proceeding
to give the complete four-state protocol. After sending
her photon from the top left, Alice encodes the bit value
‘0’ by doing nothing, and encodes the bit value ‘1’ by
turning on switchable polarisation rotators SPRA1 and
SPRA2, applying rotations R(−pi/2) and R(pi/2) to pho-
ton polarisation in upper and lower paths respectively, as
shown in Fig. 1. Bob on the other hand encodes the bit
value ‘1’ by doing nothing, and encodes the bit value ‘0’
by turning on switchable polarisation rotators SPRB1
and SPRB2, applying rotations R(pi/2) and R(−pi/2) to
photon polarisation in the upper and lower paths respec-
tively.
More precisely, Alice starts by sending in a photon,
using single-photon source S1, in the state |0〉 |+45〉,
where |0〉 corresponds to the photon being in the upper
path, and |+45〉 corresponds to 45◦ polarisation. After
passing through Alice’s 50-50 beamsplitter, the state be-
comes 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) |+45〉. If Alice chooses the bit value
‘0’, not applying her rotations, the state remains un-
changed. If Alice chooses the bit value ‘1’, applying her
rotations, the state becomes 1√
2
|0〉 |H〉+ 1√
2
|1〉 |V 〉. See
Fig. 1. Crucially, the two states 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) |+45〉 and
ar
X
iv
:1
51
2.
00
80
8v
3 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
23
 M
ar 
20
16
21√
2
|0〉 |H〉 + 1√
2
|1〉 |V 〉 are nonorthogonal and therefore
cannot be reliably distinguished by Eve [11].
For the case of Alice choosing the bit value ‘0’, sending
1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) |+45〉 into the channel, there is no which-
path information. If Bob does nothing, choosing the bit
value ‘1’, D2 clicks with certainty because of destruc-
tive interference at D1. But if Bob applies his rota-
tions, choosing the bit value ‘0’, then which-path in-
formation is introduced in the form of entanglement in
1√
2
|0〉 |H〉 + 1√
2
|1〉 |V 〉. No interference takes place: D1
and D2 are equally likely to click.
For the case of Alice choosing the bit value ‘1’, sending
1√
2
|0〉 |H〉 + 1√
2
|1〉 |V 〉 into the channel, there is which-
path information. If Bob applies his rotations, choosing
the bit value ‘0’, then which-path information is erased,
resulting in the state 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) |+45〉. D2 clicks with
certainty because of destructive interference at D1. But
if Bob does nothing, choosing the bit value ‘1’, we get no
interference: D1 and D2 are equally likely to click. Im-
portantly, whenever D1 clicks, Alice and Bob have agreed
in their bit choices. Alice publicly instructs Bob to keep
the corresponding bits, which form our sifted key. Table
I shows Alice and Bob’s random bit choices and corre-
sponding detector action.
This simplified two-state version is vulnerable to a sim-
ple Eve attack. She can make the exact measurement as
Bob using two polarisation rotators, a 50-50 beamsplit-
ter, and two detectors. For Eve not applying her rota-
tions, whenever her equivalent of Bob’s D1 clicks, she
knows Alice has sent her entangled state; Eve sends the
entangled state. If Eve’s other detector clicks, she sends
nothing. The case of Eve applying her rotations is anal-
ogous. This way Eve can obtain the full key.
We are ready to give our quantum erasure cryptog-
raphy protocol, using four states. Alice now sends her
photon either from the top using S1, or from the bottom
using S2, with equal probability. After Bob makes his
measurement, Alice announces publicly which photons
were sent from the top and which from the bottom. For
photons sent from the top, as before, bits corresponding
to D1 clicking are kept while the rest are thrown away.
For photons sent from the bottom, bits corresponding
to D2 clicking are kept while the rest are thrown away.
More precisely, the protocol proceeds as follows:
1. With probability 1/4 Alice sends Bob one of
four possible states: 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) |+45〉 or
1√
2
(|1〉 − |0〉) |+45〉, which are both unentangle, or
1√
2
|0〉 |H〉 + 1√
2
|1〉 |V 〉, or 1√
2
|1〉 |V 〉 − 1√
2
|0〉 |H〉,
which are both entangled. She encodes bit value ‘0’
by sending Bob one of the unentangled states, and
bit value ‘1’ by sending one of the entangled states.
2. Bob encodes bit value ‘0’ by making the measure-
ment corresponding to applying his polarisation ro-
tators, and encodes bit value ‘1’ by making the
measurement corresponding to not applying his po-
larisation rotators.
3. Alice announces whether she initially sent her pho-
ton from the the top using S1 or from the bottom
using S2.
4. Bob announces which of his two detectors clicked
for each photon.
5. For photons sent from the top using S1, bits cor-
responding to D1 clicking are kept. For photons
sent from the bottom using S2, bits corresponding
to D2 clicking are kept instead. Those bits that are
kept form the sifted key. The rest are thrown away.
6. Alice randomly chooses a sample from the sifted
key. Alice and Bob publicly announce correspond-
ing bits. If error rate exceeds some threshold they
then abort protocol and start over.
7. Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy
amplification to obtain the final secure key.
One of the reviewers of the present paper brought to
our attention a one-qubit protocol, reference [12], that
shares an important feature with our two-qubit protocol;
the secure key is extracted from measurement choices
rather than measurement outcomes. Whereas for both
protocols three out of four photons are on average thrown
away, in our two-qubit protocol two out of the three pho-
tons that are to be thrown away can be used to check for
an attack by Eve as shown in the next section.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We discuss two attacks by Eve. First an intercept-
resend attack, then a powerful detector-blinding attack.
Consider Eve employing an intercept-resend strategy
where, just like Bob, she brings the two paths together,
randomly choosing to either apply identical rotations to
Bob’s or not apply any before her beam-splitter and two
detectors which are also identical to Bob’s. Take the case
of Eve not applying her rotations and her lower detector
clicking. The detector could have equally been triggered
by an unentangled state or by an entangled one. But one
of the two unentangled states, which allow interference
to take place, can be ruled out. Therefore by assum-
ing that Alice has sent the other entangled state, in this
case the one corresponding to Alice sending in her pho-
ton from the top and not applying her rotations, Eve is
correct with probability 1/2. She sends this state to Bob.
The case of Eve not applying her rotations and her upper
detector clicking is analogous; she sends to Bob Alice’s
other unentangled state, that is the one corresponding
to Alice sending in her photon from the bottom and not
applying her rotations. For the case of Eve applying her
rotations, if her lower detector clicks she sends Alice’s
entangled state corresponding to Alice sending in her
3photon from the top and applying her rotations. And
if Eve’s upper detector clicks she sends Alice’s entangled
state corresponding to Alice sending in her photon from
the bottom and applying her rotations.
Let’s now work out the probability of Bob’s detec-
tor D1 incorrectly clicking for the case of Alice send-
ing in her photon from the top. Eve sends the wrong
state with probability 1/2. Based on Alice and Bob’s
bit choices, there is a 1/2 chance that the state incident
on Bob’s beam-splitter should be the unentangled state,
corresponding to Alice and Bob not agreeing on their
bit choices, leading to destructive interference at Bob’s
D1. The probability of Eve incorrectly triggering D1 is
therefore 1/2× 1/2× 1/2 = 1/8. The probability of Eve
correctly triggering D1 in this case is 1/4, with Alice
and Bob agreeing on their bit choices. (1/8 due to Eve
sending correct state plus 1/8 due to Eve sending wrong
state.) By symmetry, The probability of Eve incorrectly
triggering D2 for the case of Alice sending in her photon
from the bottom is also 1/2 × 1/2 × 1/2 = 1/8. The
probability of Eve correctly triggering D2 in this case is
1/4, with Alice and Bob agreeing on their bit choices.
(1/8 due to Eve sending correct state plus 1/8 due to
Eve sending wrong state.) Given this attack, the error
rate in the sifted key, called the quantum bit error rate
or QBER, is 1/8÷ 3/8 = 1/3.
We now show that our protocol is secure against this
intercept-resend attack. Starting with the sifted key, the
classical algorithms of error correction and privacy am-
plification can be used to generate a secure key—as long
as Bob has more information than Eve [13]. More pre-
cisely, Bob’s mutual Shannon information I(α, β) has
to be greater than Eve’s mutual Shannon information
I(α, ) which is given by,
I(α, ) = 1+
∑
r=0,1,0′,1′
P (r)
∑
i=0,1
P (r|i)P (i)
P (r)
log2
P (r|i)P (i)
P (r)
(1)
where P (i) is the probability of Alice sending bit i to
Bob, with i being either 0 or 1. P (r) is the probability of
Eve getting measurement outcome r, with r being either
0 or 1 for Eve not applying her rotations, or 0′ or 1′ for
Eve applying her rotations, where 0, 0′ correspond to bit
value ‘0’, and 1, 1′ correspond to bit value ‘1’. P (r|i)
is the probability of Eve getting r given Alice’s bit i.
With Eve’s strategy, P (r = 0) is 3/8, P (r = 1) is 1/8,
P (r = 0′) is 1/8, P (r = 1′) is 3/8, P (i = 0) is 1/2,
P (i = 1) is 1/2, P (r = 0|i = 0) is 1/2, P (r = 1|i = 0)
is 0, P (r = 0′|i = 0) is 1/4, P (r = 1′|i = 0) is 1/4,
P (r = 0|i = 1) is 1/4, P (r = 1|i = 1) is 1/4, P (r =
0′|i = 1) is 0, P (r = 1′|i = 1) is 1/2. Eve’s information
gain I(α, ) is therefore 0.311. Alice and Bob randomly
choose a sample of the sifted key, which would be thrown
away. If for this sample the estimated QBER < 33.3%,
and the estimated I(α, β) > 0.311, they proceed with
the classical algorithms of error correction and privacy
amplification to generate their secure key, otherwise they
stop the protocol.
While for Bennett and Brassard’s BB84 QKD protocol
[9], for comparison, only one out of two photons is thrown
away in order to get the sifted key, in our protocol three
out of four photons are thrown away. For this price,
however, Eve’s QBER in our erasure-based protocol is
higher than that for BB84, and Eve’s information gain is
lower. For a typical intercept-resend strategy by Eve on
BB84, Eve’s QBER is 25% for an information gain I(α, )
of 1/2, compared to a QBER of 33.3% for an information
gain I(α, ) of 0.311 in our protocol.
We have mentioned that Alice and Bob can make use
of two out of the three photons that are to be thrown
away on average, to check for an attack by Eve. When
Alice and Bob make opposite bit choices, which means
interference should take place, Bob measures polarisation
in the +45, −45 basis. He should always measure +45.
(Bob can make this measurement by replacing each of
his detectors by a 45◦ polarisation rotator, which leads
to a polarising beam-splitter, which in turn leads to two
detectors.) For Eve’s intercept-resend attack above, Eve
sends the wrong state half the time on average. This
means Bob would measure −45 polarisation with 25%
probability, alerting him to Eve’s attack.
Let us now look at Eve’s detector-blinding attack in-
spired by reference [8]. Eve performs the same measure-
ment as in the intercept-resend attack discussed above.
Her information gain I(α, ) therefore remains the same,
0.31. By means of high intensity light, Eve blinds Bob’s
detectors, causing them to only click for pulses of light
with intensity above a given threshold. With probability
1/2 Eve correctly guesses Alice’s state. Say Eve guesses
that Alice sent an unentangled state, that is bit value
‘0’. She sends a strong enough pulse made up entirely
of only one of Alice’s two entangled states chosen such
that if Bob’s bit is also ‘0’, which corresponds to Bob
applying his rotations, the whole pulse will end up at
D1(D2) for the case of Alice sending her photon from
top(bottom). If on the other hand Bob chooses bit value
‘1’, which corresponds to him not applying his rotations,
roughly half of Eve’s signal would go to one detector
while the other half would go to the other detector. The
intensity of Eve’s pulse is chosen such that half its in-
tensity is below the threshold for triggering either de-
tector. No detector clicks. But Eve sends the wrong
state to Bob roughly half the time. And given that Alice
and Bob choose different bits half the time, the proba-
bility of Eve incorrectly triggering D1(D2) for the case
of Alice sending in her photon from the top(bottom) is
1/2× 1/2× 1/2 = 1/8. The probability of Eve correctly
triggering D1(D1) is 1/2 × 1/2 = 1/4. The QBER is
therefore 1/8 ÷ (1/4 + 1/8) = 1/3. As before, for their
sample of the sifted key, if estimated QBER < 33.3%, and
estimated I(α, β) > 0.311, Alice and Bob proceed with
the classical algorithms of error correction and privacy
amplification to generate their secure key, otherwise they
stop the protocol. By comparison, against the BB84, the
detector-blinding attack enables Eve to obtain the full
4secret key without introducing any errors.
What about attacks whose aim is to learn which of
Bob’s detectors clicked? Because for each photon Bob
publicly announces which detector clicked, if any, such
attacks by Eve are not relevant. In fact, no bit-value
information is encoded in the photon incident on Bob’s
beam-splitter. Bob’s beam-splitter and two detectors, it
seems, might as well be handed to Eve—as long as the
module containing his two polarisation rotators is kept
secure. A general proof of the security of our protocol is
planned for a separate paper.
In summary, we have proposed an erasure-based proto-
col for quantum key distribution that promises inherent
security against side-channel detector attacks, discussing
its security against Eve’s powerful detector-blinding at-
tack.
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5Alice’s bit choice Bob’s bit choice Detector clicking
0 0 D1 or D2
0 1 D2
1 0 D2
1 1 D1 or D2
TABLE I. Detector action for different bit choices by Alice
and Bob for the case of Alice sending in her photon from the
top as shown in Fig. 1. D1 clicking uniquely corresponds to
Alice and Bob making the same bit choices.
Alice Bob
S1 D1
D2
BSA BSB
MR1
MR2
SPRA1
SPRA2
SPRB1
SPRB2
S2
FIG. 1. Quantum erasure cryptography. After sending in her
photon as shown, Alice encodes bit value ‘0’ by doing nothing,
and encodes bit value ‘1’ by applying switchable polarisation
rotators SPRA1 and SPRA2. Bob encodes bit value ‘1’ by do-
ing nothing, and encodes bit value ‘0’ by applying switchable
polarisation rotators SPRB1 and SPRB2. Which-path infor-
mation destroys interference, while the erasure of which-path
information restores interference. As explained in the text,
for Alice sending in her photon from the top left, D1 clicking
uniquely corresponds to Alice and Bob agreeing in their bit
choices. Ss are single-photon sources. MRs are mirrors. BSs
are 50-50 beam-splitters. Practically, the upper and lower
arms of this interferometer would be implemented using two
optical cables, in which case there would be no need for MRs.
